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Dependability Analysis of Systems With
On-Demand and Active Failure Modes,
Using Dynamic Fault Trees
Leila Meshkat, Member, IEEE, Joanne Bechta Dugan, Fellow, IEEE, and John D. Andrews
Abstract—Safety systems and protection systems can experi-
ence two phases of operation (standby and active); an accurate
dependability analysis must combine an analysis of both phases.
The standby mode can last for a long time, during which the safety
system is periodically tested and maintained. Once a demand oc-
curs, the safety system must operate successfully for the length of
demand. The failure characteristics of the system are different in
the two phases, and the system can fail in two ways:
1) It can fail to start (fail on-demand), or
2) It can fail while in active mode.
Failure on demand requires an availability analysis of com-
ponents (typically electromechanical components) which are
required to start or support the safety system. These support
components are usually maintained periodically while not in
active use.
Active failure refers to the failure while running (once started)
of the active components of the safety system. These active compo-
nents can be fault tolerant and use spares or other forms of redun-
dancy, but are not maintainable while in use.
The approach, in this paper, automatically combines the “avail-
ability analysis of the system in standby mode” with the “reliability
analysis of the system in its active mode.” The general approach
uses an availability analysis of the standby phase to determine the
initial state probabilities for a Markov model of the demand phase.
A detailed method is presented in terms of a dynamic fault-tree
model. A new “dynamic fault-tree construct” captures the depen-
dency of the demand-components on the support systems, which
are required to detect the demand or to start the demand system.
The method is discussed using a single example sprinkler system
and then applied to a more complete system taken from the off-
shore industry.
Index Terms—Dynamic fault-tree, Markov analysis, on-demand
failure, standby system.
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CBE component Boolean expression
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DDEP demand dependency
DFT dynamic fault-tree
DP diesel pump
DPS diesel power supply
EP electric pump
EPS electric power supply
FDEP functional dependency
HSS hypothetical sprinkler-system (an example)
hw hardware
ISP initial-state probability
ISPA ISP algorithm
MC Markov chain
MPS multi-phase system
SBE state Boolean expression
SDP sum of disjoint products
sw software
WDS water deluge system.
NOTATION
, set of Down, Up states
coverage probability for component
unreliability of component (covered- and
uncovered-failure)
failure, repair rates of component
availability of component at the time of de-
mand, irrespective of the support components
set of states in the MC with demand-compo-
nents partitioned into ,
: number of states in the MC with
the demand inputs partitioned to the same
, states
ISP for a state with demand-components par-
titioned into ,
event: component is available at the time of
demand, irrespective of support components
: event that component is unavailable
at the time of demand, irrespective of support
components
set of support components for demand-com-
ponent
SBE for a state with demand-components par-
titioned into ,
CBE for component .
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ASSUMPTIONS
1) The standby mode can last a long time, i.e., steady-state
availability analysis is appropriate.
2) When the system is in standby mode, demand can occur
at any time with equal likelihood.
3) When component lifetimes are considered in isolation,
they are -independent. When the components are used
in a system, there might be functional dependencies
that arise from the system-structure. Thus the model
captures the -dependencies explicitly, and assumes
-independence between the individual components.
4) Time-to-failure and time-to-repair are exponentially dis-
tributed, with constant parameters and , respectively,
for component .
5) The system is maintainable during standby mode and
nonmaintainable during demand mode.
I. INTRODUCTION
RELIABILITY analysis of safety systems, for examplesprinkler systems or other protection systems, requires
considering two kinds of failures: failure on demand and
failure during operation. That is, the system might fail to start
when needed (on demand) or, once started, it might fail during
use. Failure of the system to start when needed indicates its
unavailability on demand; the failure, once started, indicates its
unreliability during demand. The unavailability on demand of
the system depends on the failure characteristics of its support
components while in standby mode. These support components
can be periodically tested and maintained while not in active
mode.
The active components cannot be repaired/maintained during
demand. The unreliability during demand depends on the failure
characteristics of the active components during demand. The
system reliability is the probability that the system is available
upon demand, and successfully achieves the mission operation
during demand. To conduct a reliability analysis on such sys-
tems, each phase is analyzed. Phase #1 is when the system is in
standby mode, and phase #2 is when the system is operational.
This would require an availability analysis of the support sub-
system in standby mode and a reliability analysis of the active
components during demand.
A general approach is presented to integrate the analyzes
of these two phases within the context of a DFT model. DFT
extend traditional fault trees by including special constructs to
represent sequential relationships between events [4]. A new
construct, DDEP, represents the dependencies between the
components in the demand phase and its support components
in the standby phase, where a component in the demand phase
can require the availability of one or more support components
in order to commence operation. A simple motivating example
is used to define the problem, and the proposed method is
described in detail. The method is illustrated in an example
protection system adapted from the offshore oil industry. To
keep the exposition simple, some standard complications, such
as common-cause failures, are ignored. Standard approaches
apply to the resulting model.
The and are used with events to represent conjunction
(logical AND); and are used with events to represent dis-
junction (logical OR).
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Consider a computer-controlled HSS as an example. HSS
is computer-controlled, and is composed of three sensors, two
pumps, and one digital controller. Each pump has a support
stream composed of valves and filters; the pump requires that
the pump stream be operational in order to start. The sensors
send signals to the digital controller, and when temperature
readings at two of the sensors are above threshold, the controller
activates the pump. HSS is available on the demand, if at least
two of the sensors are operational, and at least one of the pumps
starts. HSS services the demand as long as at least one pump
and the controller are functional.
If a pump activates on demand, then the filters and valves
in the pump stream are in working condition. Once the pump
starts, then the valves and filters will not fail. At least one pump
is needed for the system to operate. There is a backup pump
which runs if the primary pump fails. System failure occurs if
both pumps fail.
Once a sprinkler system is activated, the sensors are no longer
needed for reliable operation. However, at least one pump and
digital controller must remain operational for a 10-h period.
Once the pump system starts, the pump stream is unlikely to
fail during operation.
If the distinction between standby and demand modes is ig-
nored, and any maintenance that is conducted on the system
while in standby mode is also ignored, then the dependencies
can be modeled using the DFT in Fig. 1 [8]. In the DFT of Fig. 1,
the functional dependence of each pump on its associated valves
and filters is captured in the FDEP [4]. The functional depen-
dency construct has a trigger input and one or more dependent
inputs. When the trigger input occurs, the dependent inputs are
forced to occur. The cold-spare relationship between the pumps
is expressed with the CSP. A CSP gate is one of several dynamic
gates introduced in [4] and is used to model several dependen-
cies associated with the use of spares.
Fig. 2 shows the MC corresponding to the fault tree in Fig. 1.
The are used to indicate covered-failures of component
[5]. Covered-failures of components might or might not lead to
system failure, depending on the remaining redundancy of the
system. Uncovered failures, however, always lead to immediate
system failure.
Some difficulties are associated with this approach:
1) Although the pump streams and the sensors are used only
to start up the system, the MC in Fig. 2 considers them
throughout the analysis, and they create additional states
in the corresponding MC. Real systems are more complex
than HSS, and state space explosion is a problem often
encountered when using MC.
2) In some instances, the components used to start up the
system are also active during demand, but have different
failure parameters.
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Fig. 1. DFT for HSS using functional dependency gate and ignoring the 2-phase nature of the system. The basic events are labeled with their failure rate.
Fig. 2. MC corresponding to DFT shown in Fig. 1 for HSS. Repair arcs are not shown.
3) The support subsystem can be subject to repair and main-
tenance while the system is in standby mode, but the
system is not allowed to be maintained during demand.
Such abrupt changes in the Markov model which occur at the
time of demand are difficult to model, in general. A MPS ap-
proach could be applied directly if either the demand time were
fixed (known) or if one could model the length of the standby
mode (arrival of the demand) with a hazard function [11]. How-
ever, the MPS approach assumes a transient solution for each
phase of the system, and has not been applied where steady-state
analysis is appropriate for one of the phases. However, the MPS
approach can be built on for the problem in this paper.
The basic MPS approach, as applied to the HSS, is shown
conceptually in Fig. 3 where the standby mode is modeled
separately from the demand mode. The Markov model for
the standby phase can be further separated into three smaller
Markov models, because the pump support streams and sensors
are functionally independent. Thus there are three separate
Markov models for the standby phase (shown on the left of the
rectangle) and one Markov model for the demand phase. The
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Fig. 3. Separate models for pump streams, sensors, and active subsystem.
MPS approach says to use the analysis of the standby phase to
determine the initial state vector for the Markov model of the
demand phase.
III. GENERAL APPROACH USING DFT
A. Overview and Applicability of Approach
The approach in this paper divides the reliability analysis
of a safety system into two separate phases: standby and
demand, and applies when the system exhibits the following
characteristics.
a) The standby phase can be arbitrarily long, and system
components are periodically tested and maintained while
awaiting a demand. Thus a steady-state or average avail-
ability analysis is performed on the system in the standby
phase.
b) When a demand occurs, the safety system must start and
be able to service the demand for a fixed time period
without maintenance or repair. The demand phase is ana-
lyzed for its reliability, which includes ability to start and,
once started, to service the demand.
c) The safety system uses active redundancy during the de-
mand phase, or otherwise exhibits some sequence-depen-
dent behavior, so that a Markov model (rather than a sim-
pler combinatorial model) is appropriate. The approach
in this paper applies when the demand phase can be mod-
eled combinatorially, but some simplifications might be
appropriate.
d) The support components are passive, and are needed only
to detect a demand or to start the demand system; they are
not needed to service the demand once the safety system
is activated.
e) Two special subsets of the system components can be
identified: demand-components and support compo-
nents. Demand components are necessary to service the
demand, and thus appear in the reliability model for the
demand phase. Support components are needed to detect
the demand or to start the safety system, but are often not
needed once the safety system has been activated. Each
demand-component is associated with a (possibly empty)
set of support components that must be available for the
demand-component to start. Each support component is
associated with a set of demand-components that depend
on it.
Two subproblems must be considered:
1) How does an analyst specify the model? Such a speci-
fication must be precise enough to allow both: i) auto-
matic generation of a set of models for the standby and
demand phases and ii) mapping of the dependencies of
the demand-components on their support components.
2) Once the models are generated, how does one solve the
models and connect the required information between
them?
Fig. 4 overviews the approach in this paper; it shows the two
phases of the model and the connections between them, as well
as the information and parameters required for each model.
The methodology is defined in terms of a DFT model; a new
DFT construct to is defined to express the dependency of the
demand-components on subsystems of support components. A
steady-state availability analysis of the support components is
used to determine the initial state vector for the Markov model
of the demand phase.
The association between demand-components and support-
components is general enough to allow multiple support-com-
ponents for a single demand-component and to allow a sup-
port-component to support more than one demand-component.
Thus the key to the methodology is the mapping between the
two phases: determination of the ISP vector for the states in the
MC of the demand phase.
Each state in the MC represents the operational or failed
status of the components in the demand phase, and does not
explicitly include the status of the support components. Thus,
evaluating the ISP requires determining the corresponding
status (operational at time of demand or not) of the support
components, based on the status of the supported demand-com-
ponents. For some states, it is possible to determine the status of
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Fig. 4. Overview of general approach.
all support components, and thus the ISP is easily determined.
In many cases, however, the status of the support components
is ambiguous, and all possible cases must be considered.
The work in this paper builds on the preliminary approach to a
similar problem in [9] and on the MPS approach in [1]–[3], [10];
[9] obtains the ISP of the MC associated with the reliability anal-
ysis phase using the availability measures of the system while
in standby mode. This paper extends their approach to the more
general case, and provides an explicit algorithm for considering
nondisjoint sets of support components, and engineers the ap-
proach to work within the DFT analysis methodology.
B. DDEP Construct
Within the context of a DFT model, define a new fault-tree
construct to model failure on demand, called DDEP and shown
in Fig. 5. The first input (or support input) to DDEP is a fault tree
describing the causes of failure-on-demand (or failure to start).
This support input can be either a static or DFT whose com-
ponents are characterized by failure parameters, repair rates,
and/or maintenance intervals. The support subtree is solved for
its unavailability: probability that the dependent subsystem is
unable to start when demanded. The remaining inputs are depen-
dent events which represent those system components whose
functionality depends on the availability-on-demand of the sup-
port subsystem. If the support subsystem is unavailable at the
time of demand, then the dependent events are forced to occur.
To facilitate automatic solution of systems using DDEP, the
support input to a DDEP must be a module, viz, it must not
share basic events with any other subtree in the system fault tree.
A module can be replaced in the overall system fault-tree with
a single event, whose availability is determined by solving the
subtree rooted at the top node in the module. Thus the support
subsystems can be treated as a basic event in the fault tree, and
the analysis of the support system can be separated from the
analysis of the demand system. (See [6], [12] for more informa-
tion on modularizing fault trees.)
Fig. 5. DDEP construct.
C. Modeling HSS Using DDEP
Fig. 6 shows the fault-tree model of the HSS using DDEP. The
dependence of the pump start-up on the correct functionality of
at least two of the sensors is shown by the first DDEP construct.
If these sensors are unavailable at the time of demand, the pumps
become unavailable; hence the system cannot start up. On the
other hand, the pumps also need their respective pump streams
to be working in order to start up. This is shown by the other
DDEP construct. Pump #2 is a backup pump, and is activated
only if pump #1 is in a failed state. Therefore, if the pump stream
for pump #1 is unavailable, but the pump stream for pump #2
two is available, and the sensors are available, then the system
will start up using pump #2, instead of pump #1. The separate
subsystems of HSS can be modeled using MC as in Fig. 3. Be-
cause the subsystems are static, they can be modeled using com-
binatorial methods such as BDD [6], which are mode efficient.
Fig. 7 shows this analysis of the HSS example. The initial
failure probabilities for the pump streams and sensors are com-
puted by solving the fault-tree models at the support input of
each DDEP, producing an unreliability and a coverage value.
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Fig. 6. Fault tree for HSS using DDEP.
Fig. 7. Mapping scheme for ISP of the reliability-analysis phase.
The coverage parameter associated with each component is in-
dicated by , and the unreliability of that component
by .
IV. DETERMINING ISP FOR THE DEMAND PHASE MODEL
The key to the interface between the standby and demand
phases is the determination of the ISP vector for the states in the
Markov model of the demand phase. The solution of the standby
phase for the availability of each of the support components and
demand-components is used to determine the initial probability
for each combination of demand-components in the MC. The
Markov model of the demand phase is then solved for the relia-
bility for the demand time, given the ISP vector as a state of the
initial conditions for the demand phase.
The algorithm developed for determining the initial state iter-
ates over each operational state in the Markov model. There can
be more than one state in the MC associated with a particular
combination of failed and operational demand-components, be-
cause the order in which the events occur can be important. For
example, if components and share spare , then there are
two states in which both and have failed and is oper-
ational: 1) replacing , and 2) replacing . Where there
is more than one state associated with a particular combination,
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this procedure assumes that each of these states is equally likely
to be the initial state with this combination.
The approach for finding the ISP of the MC for the demand
phase is based on identifying the respective sources of avail-
ability and unavailability for each operational and failed com-
ponent in each state. The issue of shared support components
complicates the calculation as follows:
1) If a demand-component is operational in a state, then infer
that all the support components are operational.
2) If a demand-component is failed, then either the compo-
nent failed on its own during the standby mode, or at least
one of its support components can be unavailable.
3) If there is a support component that is shared between
an up and down component in the same state, then the
support component can not have been the cause of the
failure for any of the down components.
A. ISP Algorithm
The ISPA takes as input:
a) A partition of the set of demand-components into
(those which are up in the state) and (those which
are down).
b) The number of states in the MC with this same partition,
.
c) For each demand-component , a set of support compo-
nents, which support component .
d) The intrinsic availability of each demand-component
during standby : at the time of demand. “In-
trinsic” means that the availability of the component
when all its support-components are available. If a
demand-component can not fail during standby then its
intrinsic availability is simply 1.
e) The availability of each support-component , ,
which is obtained by solving the fault trees which serve
as support inputs to a DDEP gate.
The ISPA produces as output: , the ISP for an opera-
tional state in the Markov model of the demand phase.
ISPA iterates over each demand-component , and builds a
state Boolean expression representing the event
associated with the state. The state Boolean expression is a con-
junction of the component Boolean expressions for each
component .
If demand-component is up ( ) then it has not failed
during the standby phase, and all of its support components must
be operational.
(1)
If a component is down, that could be caused by the compo-
nent’s failing on its own, or one or more of its support compo-
nents failing. However, suppose there is a support component
for a down demand-component which is also supporting an up
component in the same state. Then, the support component must
be up, and therefore cannot be contributing to the unreliability
of the down demand-component. When constructing the
Fig. 8. Schematic representation of the deluge system pump stream.
Fig. 9. Fault-tree model of computer-system in WDS.
for a down component, include only the support components
which are not supporting an up component in the same state.
(2)
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Fig. 10. Fault-tree showing pump-stream for WDS.
The state Boolean expression is then the conjunction of the
Boolean expressions associated with each component.
(3)
The SBE can then be expressed in disjoint products using an
SDP algorithm [13] or converted to a BDD directly to evaluate
its probability.
The ISP for a state where the set of demand-components is
partitioned into (those which are up in the state) and
(those which are down) is then
(4)
While iterating over all operational states, keep a running sum
of the ISP. When the iteration is finished, the running sum is
subtracted from one to produce the ISP for the Fail-to-Start state.
The ISP for the Fail-Covered and Fail-Uncovered states are both
0, because these states record failures of the demand system
during the demand.
V. WATER DELUGE SYSTEM EXAMPLE
Now, consider a more complete example: the water-deluge
system [8] in Fig. 8. The features of this system are typical of
water-spray systems used in many different off-shore industries.
Four pumps are used to provide the water demand to the ring-
main. The ringmain transports the water around the platform to
the take-off points where it is used to protect against the haz-
ards posed by hydrocarbon fires and explosions. Pressure in the
ringmain is maintained by a jockey pump (not shown in the
figure). When the take-off valves open, and water is delivered to
the spray nozzles, then the ringmain pressure drops. Ringmain
pressure is monitored and transmitted to the computer control
system by the three pressure transmitters: PS1–PS3. When two
of the three transmitters indicate a low ringmain pressure, then
the main pumps are activated in the order indicated from top to
bottom of the diagram: EP1, EP2, DP1, DP2. As long as two
pumps are available, then water can be delivered at the required
rate to satisfy demand. Four pumps provide redundancy in the
system: pumps 1 and 2 are electric powered; pumps 3 and 4 are
the diesel backups.
The features on each pump stream are identical. Because the
water supply is direct from the sea, a filter is fitted on each
stream. Manual isolation valves are located on either side of the
pump for maintenance purposes. A pressure-relief valve pro-
vides protection for the pump, and a test valve on each line en-
ables individual pumps to be tested without fully activating the
deluge system.
There are two failure-modes of concern for each stream:
1) It fails to start (unavailable);
2) It fails once running (unreliable).
If a pump stream activates on demand, it means that the filter,
isolation valves, test valve, and pressure relief valve which are
all (for this function) passive components are in working con-
dition. Because they are passive, they are unlikely to fail in the
relatively short running times if they work initially. These are
static failure modes. The pump is, however, a dynamic compo-
nent and can also fail when it is running. System failure occurs
if fewer than two of the four streams can be activated: three of
the four fail.
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Fig. 11. Fault-tree showing pump-stream using the DDEP gate for WDS.
A. Fault-Tree Model of WDS
The computer-control system consists of three pressure-sen-
sors (of which two are needed), plus the hardware and the
software. The hardware consists of redundant processors in
hot standby mode, each equipped with identical software.
While the spare processor is in spare mode, it is monitoring
the inputs and outputs of the primary, in order to provide
detection and recovery in case of error. When an error is
detected, control is switched to the backup processor. The
computer-control system can thus tolerate a single (detected)
hardware or software failure. However, an undetected error
causes failure of the computer subsystem regardless of the state
of the backup. This latter case (undetected error) is an example
of an uncovered fault, which leads to immediate system-failure.
Another example of an uncovered fault is a software fault that
affects both processors simultaneously. One might anticipate,
because the software on both processors are identical, that all
software faults would affect both processors. However, there
are field data to support the assumption that a large fraction of
software faults affect only a single processor [7]. Fig. 9 shows
a fault-tree model including the failure of the computer system,
in which the basic events represent hardware (processors),
software, and the sensor set.
Next, consider the pump system, consisting of the four
pumps, their power sources (two are electric, and two are
diesel) and their pump streams (associated valves and filters).
For now, ignore the pump streams and power supplies, and
concentrate on the four pumps.
The set of four pumps operate in standby redundancy: the
two electric pumps are started first, and the diesel pumps pro-
vide replacements when the electric pumps are unavailable. On
demand, pumps EP1 and EP2 are turned on. If one of these
two fails, it is replaced by DP1. The second pump failure is re-
placed by DP2. This dynamic redundancy scheme introduces
dependencies between the failures, and requires special mod-
eling techniques. A pump which is in use experiences a different
failure rate than one in standby. Therefore, one must keep track
of which pumps are being used and which are in standby. A
spare gate is used to model the failure dependencies that arise
from the use of spares.
1) A component which is used as a spare has an associ-
ated dormancy-factor, , which is a multiplica-
tive factor to the active failure-rate to produce the spare
failure-rate. If the dormancy factor is 0, then the spare is a
cold-spare; a cold-spare cannot fail before being switched
into active operation (failure to activate is modeled as an
uncovered failure). If the dormancy factor is 1, then the
spare is a hot spare and can fail at the same rate as when
active. The in-between situation is a warm spare; a warm
spare can fail before switched into active operation, but
does so at a lower rate than when active.
2) Pooled-spares are spares that can be used as a replacement
for whichever of a set of components fails first. Modeling
pooled-spares requires keeping track of not only the state
of each component, but also the order in which they have
failed, so that “which spare is being used where” can be
determined.
3) Components might have preferences for replacements,
in that there is a priority or order in which spares are
used. This order might well be different for various
components.
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Fig. 12. MC for reliability-analysis phase of pump system.
The spare gate has a set of at least two inputs: the first (left-
most) of which is the designated primary, and the second and
subsequent (from left to right) are the spares. When the primary
fails, it is replaced (in order) by the spares which are still avail-
able (not failed and not used elsewhere). The single output of the
spare gate returns “true” when the primary and the spares have
been exhausted. Basic events representing spares have failure
rates, coverage factors, and dormancy factors.
Continuing to ignore the power supplies and pump streams,
the fault-tree in Fig. 10 models the pumps and their spares.
The pump-system fails when there are no longer two available
pumps (thus the OR gate with two inputs). The basic events,
EP1 and EP2 represent the two electric pumps, which are
both initially active (on demand). The two diesel pumps, DP1
and DP2, are pooled-spares shared by both electric pumps.
The first electric-pump failure is replaced by DP1, and the
second by DP2. If EP2 is preferred to be replaced by DP2
then switch the order of DP1 and DP2 inputs on the second
spare gate.
Consider the power supplies. There is an electrical power-
supply for pumps EP1 and EP2 and a diesel-supply for DP1
and DP2. If a power-supply fails, then the associated pumps are
unavailable (essentially failed). The functional-dependency gate
can be used to model the functional dependence of the pumps
on the power supplies: the power supply is the trigger event and
the two pumps are the dependent events. The fault tree in Fig. 10
shows this. Using the DDEP-gate, separate the static-analysis
of the pump stream from the dynamic-analysis of the pumps
themselves as shown in Fig. 11.
B. WDS ISP
Fig. 12 shows the MC for the reliability analysis of the pump
system of the water-deluge system; Fig. 13 shows the MC for
the reliability analysis of the computer system. These MC can
be derived automatically from the fault trees in Figs. 10 and 9,
respectively. The dotted arrows in the MC emanating from the
box show the states with nonzero ISP.
First, consider the Markov model of the pump system, in
Fig. 12. The demand-components included in this model are the
electric and diesel power supplies, the two electric pumps, and
the two diesel pumps. The intrinsic availability of each of these
components is 1; thus the only cause of unavailability on de-
mand (failure to start) is the support systems. The four support
systems are the valve and filter systems, one for each pump, of
two types (DP and EP). Fig. 11 shows the detail for a typical
pump-stream.
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Fig. 13. MC for reliability-analysis phase of computer system.
The nonzero ISP for operational states in the Markov model
of the pump subsystem of the WDS are
(5)
Next, consider the Markov model of the computer system,
shown in Fig. 13. The computer system has no support sub-
systems, but each individual component is subject to failure
and maintenance during the standby phase. For each operational
state, therefore, the ISP is simply the probability of the combi-
nation of demand-component availabilities and unavailabilities
as defined by the state
(6)
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